God\u27s Ability to Will Moral Evil by Brown, Robert F.
Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers 
Volume 8 Issue 1 Article 1 
1-1-1991 
God's Ability to Will Moral Evil 
Robert F. Brown 
Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy 
Recommended Citation 
Brown, Robert F. (1991) "God's Ability to Will Moral Evil," Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of 
Christian Philosophers: Vol. 8 : Iss. 1 , Article 1. 
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol8/iss1/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative 
exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. 
GOD'S ABILITY TO WILL MORAL EVIL 
Robert F. Brown 
Pike, Reichenbach, and others, correctly hold that a God whose very nature 
prevents him from doing evil cannot properly be regarded as morally good. 
But they fail to show just how God's moral goodness can be effectively 
independent of his ontological goodness, how God can be "significantly free" 
and so be morally praiseworthy. I argue that their contention calls for a 
greater modification of classical theism than they realize, i.e., for abandoning 
the traditional subordination of God's will to God's (supposedly necessary) 
goodness. I explore a way of reconceiving the relation of God's will to his 
nature, so that he actually can be morally praiseworthy, free either to obey 
or to violate his own moral law. 
Nelson Pike, Bruce Reichenbach, and others have argued that classical Chris-
tian theism holds an inadequate view of God's goodness in relation to God's 
freedom and power to do what is morally evil.) The New Testament Epistle 
of James, verse 13, states that "God cannot be tempted by evil"; the Church 
Fathers elaborated this theme as the doctrine of divine impeccability. On this 
foundation arose the classical view that God lacks the ability or creative 
power to bring about any morally reprehensible state of affairs. Pike argues 
that a God who could not do evil also could not be morally good, for refrain-
ing from doing evil is morally praiseworthy only because the one who refrains 
is able to do evil. On a religiously adequate notion of divine goodness, God 
can do moral evil but refrains, or freely chooses not to do it. 
Pike and Reichenbach have been subjected to thoughtful criticism. 2 I shall 
take brief note of such criticism, although it is not my main purpose to defend 
them against it. I believe their general approach (hereafter often referred to 
as "Pike's position") is viable, but not in its present form and without elab-
oration of its fuller implications for our conception of God's nature and will. 
My chosen task here is not so much to defend Pike's position as it is to extend it. 
Pike and his supporters do not explain how to conceive of God as having 
the freedom to will, and the power to carry out, moral evil. After examining 
their views and a bit of the criticism, I shall explain why the traditional 
doctrine of God needs more extensive modification than they apparently 
realize. To make their conception of God's moral goodness feasible, they also 
need to revise the classical conception of God's will in relation to the con-
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ceptions of God's immutability and of his own goodness, and to the goodness 
of other things that God wills. 3 The argument of this paper shall, however, 
try as much as possible to remain within the general framework of classical 
theism rather than resorting outright to some modern position, such as process 
metaphysics or existentialism, that almost completely discards that tradition. 
Retained, among others, are the traditional assumptions that whatever God 
wills God wills efficaciously,4 and that God's causality operates not only 
directly but also indirectly, through the use of creatures as intermediate or 
proximate causes of the effects God wills to bring about. Nevertheless, the 
statement that "God can will what is morally evil" here refers not to God's 
permitting, or sustaining by creative power, the evil acts freely chosen by 
creatures; it refers instead to God's freedom directly to will, and thereby 
initiate, moral evil himself. 
I. Omnipotence and the Ability to Will Moral Evil 
Pike directs attention to an apparent conflict in the classical tradition be-
tween two divine attributes: 
1. Omnipotence: God can bring about any state of affairs that is consistently 
describable, i.e., that is free of logical contradiction; as Aquinas says, God 
can do "whatever is possible absolutely" (ST!, Q25, A3). 
2. Perfect goodness: God cannot sin, i.e., God cannot act in a morally repre-
hensible way (Aquinas, ST!, Q19, A9). 
Their conjunction suggests that God both could and could not bring about 
certain consistently describable events. Pike's example is the avoidable and 
protracted dying from starvation of an innocent child, where its suffering and 
death has no value (as edification, punishment, etc.) for it or for anyone else. 
An omnipotent deity could surely bring about such a morally reprehensible 
event, whereas a perfectly good one could not (Pike, pp. 209-10). 
How does classical theism solve this logical difficulty? Anselm, in discuss-
ing the possibility of God's being corrupted or telling lies, writes: 
... when someone is said to have the 'power' of doing or suffering something 
which is not to his advantage or which he ought not to do, then by 'power' 
here we mean 'impotence,' for the more he has this 'power,' the more adver-
sity and perversity have power over him and the more is he powerless against 
them.5 
Aquinas agrees, for doing moral evil is "falling short of a perfect action," which 
is a defect incompatible with omnipotence (ST!, Q25, A3, reply to obj. 2). 
Pike's counter argument is that being morally weak ("falling short in ac-
tion") is logically compatible with being able to bring about any consistently 
describable state; that is, there is no logical or conceptual difficulty in the 
idea of a diabolical omnipotent being (Pike, p. 210). To this a Platonist might 
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retort that the perfect instances of all ontological perfections are inseparable 
and so must coincide in one being. From this ontological (but not logical) 
principle it would follow that an omnipotent being must also be perfectly 
good, and vice versa. Pike does not consider this option. Nevertheless, that 
general Platonic principle cannot sustain the specific contention that because 
God is omnipotent God lacks the ability freely to do moral evil. As we shall 
see shortly, it is dubious first to allow an ontological notion of goodness to 
control the meaning of omnipotence (as does Anselm), and from that privi-
leged meaning of omnipotence then to restrict the scope of God's free will 
with regard to moral goodness. Subordination of the meaning of one perfec-
tion to that of another cries out for further justification, but the theological 
Platonist does not provide it. 
It is important to note that, the title of his paper notwithstanding, Pike is 
not mainly concerned with the doctrine of omnipotence per se, nor does his 
discussion presuppose a highly technical or contentious conception of om-
nipotence. He is mainly concerned with a conception of moral freedom, and 
that is my main concern as well. Pike attacks a special Anselmian-Thomistic 
qualification imposed upon omnipotence that has the effect of curtailing 
God's moral freedom. His contention that an omnipotent God can bring about 
any consistently describable state amounts to rephrasing Thomas ("God can 
do all that is possible absolutely") minus the qualification ("except to will 
moral evil or to be morally evil"). But Pike's attack on the Anse1mian-Tho-
mistic view that omnipotence entails divine inability to will moral evil does 
not actually arise from a primary concern with omnipotence; it is not simply 
the contrary view that omnipotence entails the ability to sin. To argue in that 
way would require a full-dress analysis of omnipotence, far beyond what Pike 
provides. In drawing out the implications of Pike's position, I do not argue 
from a supposed logical incompatibility of divine impeccability with omnip-
otence; the pivotal attribute for the argument is not divine omnipotence but 
divine will. A divine ability to will moral evil is to be envisaged and defended 
as the consequence of a certain freedom of the divine will (which must, to 
be sure, be coupled with power sufficient to effect whatever it wills). 
Consider the case of a strong man with the muscular power sufficient to 
lift a certain heavy object, but who has been hypnotized so that he could not 
want, or intend, to lift it. In one sense he has the ability to lift it, but in another 
he does not. Pike seems to be thinking of a divine ability somewhat analogous 
to both these senses taken together. He thinks that if God's acts are to count 
as morally good, then God must be without the Anselmian counterpart to the 
strong man's hypnotic block, that is, he must be genuinely free in a moral 
sense; he must not be prevented, by a necessary goodness of his own nature, 
from willing or intending certain kinds of acts.6 
A different possibility (mentioned in passing by Aquinas, in STl, Q25, A3, 
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reply to obj. 2) is that God can do what seems evil to us but is not really evil. 
However, Pike declares that it is illegitimate to shift the meaning of "evil" 
or of "morally reprehensible" just to protect one's flank philosophically, 
when God rather than a creature is said to be the actor. Aquinas himself 
teaches the "analogy of being," according to which God's own being contains 
to an eminent degree the same perfections present to a lesser degree in 
creatures (ST!, Q4, AA2-3). Accordingly, for Thomas God's moral goodness 
cannot really be different from ours in kind rather than just in degree (if we 
ignore the differences in means suitable to immaterial beings and material 
beings respectively, for carrying out their actions). Pike holds that the stan-
dard for measuring God's moral goodness cannot be different from the stan-
dard for measuring ours; the contrast is just that God regularly meets that 
standard (of truthfulness, justice, etc.) and we do not. On Thomistic grounds, 
moreover, we can be said to possess from revelation and natural reason a 
knowledge on the whole reliable as to what that standard is. According to 
Pike, therefore, if God were to act in a way that we would unhesitatingly call 
morally evil were a human agent the actor instead (such as by causing the 
death by starvation of an innocent child, as in the example above), it would 
be an evasion on our part to say that in this instance that act cannot be morally 
evil, solely for the reason that it is God who is doing it. OUT moral conceptions 
and discourse should not be so elastic as that. 7 
Pike next introduces three distinct meanings of the statement "God cannot 
sin," i.e., cannot do something morally reprehensible: 
1. A logical impossibility: ~If X sins, then X cannot qualify as God." This 
meaning treats ~God" as a title rather than as a common noun or a proper 
name, and it stipulates one qualification for bearing this title. It says 
nothing about limits on the power of X, but only says that if X were to 
sin then X would forfeit entitlement to be God.8 
2. A material concept: ~God lacks the creative power to sin." A being ma-
terially incapable of sinning cannot be morally good, since it lacks the 
power to be morally evil; nor can it be omnipotent, except on the mistaken 
view of Anselm and Aquinas. 
3. A morally praiseworthy status: ~God cannot bring himself to sin." This 
means that God is strongly disposed not to act in a morally reprehensible 
way, but is not actually prevented from doing so, not even by his own 
nature. 
The religious believer is fully confident that God will freely choose to main-
tain a good character in the future. Nevertheless this third meaning of "God 
cannot sin" is logically compatible with the first one only, not with the 
second. According to Pike, the error of Anselm and Aquinas lies in confusing 
the second meaning with the third, in representing "unable to sin" as the 
correct meaning of "choosing not to sin"; it further lies in associating "unable 
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to sin" with omnipotence. Thus they mistakenly suppose that omnipotence 
and moral perfection entail a material inability or lack of creative power to 
do moral evil (Pike, p. 216). 
These then are Pike's conclusions: 
1. There is no logical connection between perfect moral goodness and om-
nipotence. 
2. God has the creative power to do what is morally reprehensible, but freely 
chooses not to. To say that "God cannot bring himself to sin" is simply to 
attribute to God a certain character seen in the consistent way that God 
exercises free choice. 
In this connection we might note William J. Wainwright's observations about 
one version of the argument that God cannot sin, an argument based at least 
in part on the assumption that" ... being God is an essential attribute of the 
being who is God ... "9 Wainwright remarks (p. 249) that "classical theism 
would, I think, reject the notion that it is merely a contingent fact that the 
being who is God, is God ... ," and he also observes that from the premiss that 
it is necessarily true that a being who is God does not sin, "it follows that 
classical theism is committed to the view that God is unable to sin" in the 
strong sense-it is a logical or a causal (Le., material) impossibility. But 
Wainwright adds (p. 249): 
Whether classical theism needs to assert the first premiss ['It is necessarily 
true that the being who is God, is God'] is another question. It is possible 
that the first premiss can be rejected without in any other way seriously 
modifying the theistic position. 
Pike clearly rejects that premiss. His rejection can be expressed in the form 
of a third conclusion. 
3. Perfect moral goodness may in the eyes of religious believers be logically 
connected with "being God," but it is only contingently connected with 
"the being who is God." 
To accept these three conclusions evidently would require a significant mod-
ification of the framework of classical theism, though not its wholesale re-
jection. 
II. Ontological and Moral Goodness Distinguished 
Reichenbach's criticism of Aquinas further illumines the difficulty regard-
ing God's goodness. He identifies two distinct senses in which God is said 
to be good. The first expresses an ontological conception: "God is good 
because of his nature." Aquinas bases this conception upon two points: 
1. God alone is pure act (God's essence is to exist); thus God alone has the 
perfection of self-sufficiency (ST!, Q3, A4). 
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2. God is the good at which all things aim (the final cause of all things); thus 
God alone is his own end (STl, Q5, A4, and Q6, AI). 
Conceived in this way, God's goodness and God's being are coextensive. 
Hence God is said to be good essentially and necessarily. According to 
Aquinas, God wills his own goodness necessarily, and wills other things only 
as ordered to his own goodness (ST!, Q19, A3). Since God's transient acts, 
or acts ad extra, must accord with his own necessarily good nature, they must 
be good; their goodness is a necessary consequence of God's own ontological 
structure. 10 
The second sense expresses a moral conception: "God does, and is disposed 
to do, what is good." Reichenbach agrees with Pike that for this moral con-
ception to be meaningful, "God cannot do evil" must not have logical or 
ontological force. God's refraining from moral evil must be due to God's 
freely maintained character and not to lack of power or opportunity. 
Reichenbach argues that the ontological conception cannot undergird the 
moral conception because it cannot satisfy at least one of the necessary 
conditions for an act to count as morally good. Aquinas insists that God is 
free to act or not to act in various ways; for example, God does not have to 
create a world and, if he does, it does not have to be the best of all possible 
worlds. But his God is not significantly free in Alvin Plantinga's sense. 
Plantinga defines an action as " ... morally significant, for a given person at 
a given time, if it would be wrong for him to perform the action then but 
right to refrain, or vice versa"; he adds that a person is significantly free when 
he or she is free to do or not to do some morally significant actionY For 
Reichenbach, significant freedom of the actor is a necessary condition for an 
act to count as morally good, and this is a condition that cannot be satisfied 
if it is logically or ontologically l2 impossible for that actor to do moral evil 
(pp. 55-57). On Aquinas's account, God's acts cannot be significantly free, 
i.e., free qua the rightness of the acts. Reichenbach therefore says that we 
cannot appropriately call this God "good" in the moral sense (p. 59). 
Reichenbach concludes that for Aquinas divine goodness is exclusively on-
tological, and not moral. It only seems moral because of an equivocation 
between the two senses of "good." 
One likely objection is that this appeal to significant freedom amounts to 
a substitution of a libertarian notion of freedom as the uncaused or uncon-
strained power of self-determination where alternatives are available to be 
chosen, in place of a very different notion held by classical theists. Augustine, 
Anselm, Aquinas, et ai., depict the highest sort of freedom (that possessed 
by God, the good angels, and the blessed in heaven) as an utter inability to 
sin. This is not just a contingent freedom from being actually sinful, but a 
freedom from the possibility of ever being sinful (again, in the human case), 
an ontological immunity either possessed by nature (in the case of God) or 
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conferred by grace (upon good angels and blessed humans). On this view 
God's ontological goodness stands as an ideal toward which creatures in their 
efforts at moral goodness should aspire and strive. Their striving is morally 
praiseworthy but their ideal, God's own ontological goodness, is not. But that 
is no defect in God, whose moral praiseworthiness consists only in his freely 
willed acts of grace or supererogation. A fair response is that this objection is 
correct, that Pike's position requires that such a substitution be made. With that 
acknowledged-Pike and Reichenbach could be more forthright about the 
substitution and could give a fuller defense of the libertarian option-the issue 
is then the relative merits of the two rival conceptions of divine freedom. 
It is a large task to defend the general superiority of a libertarian notion of 
freedom as applied to God's own goodness and will, one that lies beyond the 
scope of this paper, as already stated. 13 Here I shall simply comment on one 
facet, the use of the term "morally praiseworthy." To say, as some defenders 
of classical theism do, that God need not be morally praiseworthy for the 
goodness of his willing (aside from acts of grace or supererogation) is to be 
insufficiently attentive to ordinary religious beliefs. To praise God for the 
way his guiding hand routinely affects human affairs is not, to the believer, 
like our (non-moral) admiration of the elephant for its strength, of the bee 
for its diligence, or even of Miss America Pageant contestants for their natural 
beauty. It is rather more like praising Jane Doe for the honest way in which 
she conducts her law practice. To "praise" without thereby giving credit for 
choices made and effort exerted, without imputing freedom and responsibility 
to the one praised, hardly seems to capture the main sense of the term as we 
use it in religious and other contexts. Not all such praise need be for moral 
acts. One could give due credit by praising an aesthetic accomplishment, for 
example, of a pianist who chooses to practice and study over many years in 
order to make a fine performance possible. It seems a bit odd to suggest that 
religious believers don't intend to give credit and impute responsibility to 
God in a comparable way for the things God does that are analogous to the 
moral acts of human beings, odd to deny that God is a moral actor (and so 
could do otherwise than he does). One way around this would be to declare 
arbitrarily that all divine acts of moral significance must be in fact super-
erogatory, so that God's omitting to perform them would not be morally 
wrong. That extreme stance would, I think, be unfaithful to the intention of 
most people's actual religious beliefs. 
We have seen then that, on the views of Pike and Reichenbach, we cannot 
deduce the moral goodness of God's acts from God's nature as a given, and 
therefore God must be able to will moral evil. But someone favoring Pike's 
approach cannot rest content at this point. The relation between God's willing 
and God's being requires further scrutiny; we must take a still closer look at 
Aquinas. 
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III. The Deeper Problem 
Christian Platonism and Aristotelianism not only mistakenly derive a ma-
terial inability to do moral evil from the attribute of omnipotence (as Pike 
holds), and equivocate between ontological and moral senses of "good" (as 
Reichenbach holds). These philosophies also are burdened with a deficient 
view of will, one that leads to a religiously unsatisfactory conception of the 
relation of God's will to God's being and goodness. 14 
The difficulty becomes clear when we examine a progression of seven 
points found in Aquinas (Sn, Q19: "Will in God"), the first four of which 
are: 
1. The objective of God's will is his own goodness (AI, reply to obj. 3). 
2. God wills his own goodness with absolute necessity (A3). 
3. God wills other things insofar as they have his own goodness as their end 
(A3). 
4. "To be good" and "to be desirable" have the same signification (A9; cf. 
Q5, Ai). 
As we have seen, because divine goodness alone is perfectly desirable, God 
necessarily wills (read: "ratifies," not "originates") his own goodness, and 
freely wills other things only in such a way as to be ordered to his own 
goodness. IS From the Thomistic principle that all divine attributes are one in 
the unity of the divine essence (Sn, Q13, A12, reply), we might expect a 
reciprocity between God's goodness and God's will; instead we find an asym-
metrical relation. On the one hand, the perfect desirability of God's goodness 
makes it impossible for God to will otherwise than harmoniously with it. On 
the other hand, however, God himself is not good because of willing his own 
goodness, for God's nature cannot be other than it is. Its perfect desirability 
makes God's goodness a final cause ineluctably drawing God's will to it; 
divine goodness determines divine will, and not vice versa. This way of 
thinking scarcely yields an acceptable notion of God's will as free, in the 
sense Pike and Reichenbach require for God's actions to count as morally 
praiseworthy. 
In his transient acts God cannot command or act contrary to his own 
goodness, i.e., God is not free to will in a morally evil or reprehensible 
fashion, in the way that creatures can. Thus Aquinas continues (again, in sn, 
Q19, A9): 
5. An appetitive power can directly seek only what has ontological goodness, 
Le., being and inherent desirability. Thus no evil can be directly wanted 
by natural appetite, or by the intelligent appetite that is will. 
6. Creatures can will moral evil indirectly, concomitantly to their direct 
willing of some good lesser than they ought to will. 
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7. God can will (i.e., permit, and create the necessary conditions for,) phys-
ical evil or suffering for the sake of some greater good to which it is 
attached, but God cannot will moral evil at all, for God cannot upset the 
ordering of all things to the divine goodness. 
11 
Thus the supremely desirable ontological goodness of God's nature con-
strains God's will as appetitive power, so that in his transient acts God is 
materially incapable of willing contrary to that goodness, i.e., is materially 
incapable of willing moral evil. 
This non-reciprocal relation between God's good being and God's will is 
deeply embedded in the Platonic and Aristotelian philosophical heritage that 
Aquinas and other classical theists build upon. Pike and Reichenbach cor-
rectly point out the main symptom of this deficiency as it affects the doctrine 
of God. Theirs is just a cosmetic remedy that conceals a deeper problem, 
however, if they simply affirm that God, although ontologically good himself, 
is in his transient acts free to will in a morally significant sense, and leave it 
at that. For divine freedom to be actually moral, God must be self-determining 
in a way that classical notions of goodness as inherent desirability, and of 
will as appetitive, are incapable of expressing. A truly voluntaristic or liber-
tarian conception of God's will is needed to carry through the program of 
Pike and Reichenbach consistently. 
IV. One Direction to Take 
The needed conception can be found in a minority viewpoint within clas-
sical theism itself. There is the curiously hybrid thought of Augustine, a 
Platonist when it comes to the doctrine of God, but also the chief architect 
of the theological conception of human free will. To him we owe the famous 
declaration that: 
... unless the movement of the will towards this or that object is voluntary 
and within our power, a man would not be praiseworthy when he turns to the 
higher object nor blameworthy when he turns to lower objects, using his will 
like a hinge. 16 
This imprecise but suggestive comparison of the human will to a hinge that 
can turn itself either way, toward God or away from God, underlies our basic 
notions of human moral praiseworthiness and of sinfulness. 
Can we represent God's willing in a comparable way, even though Augus-
tine himself did not? I believe Pike's position should also directly oppose the 
classical assumption that willing has for its object only what has being and 
thus ontological goodness, because that restrictive assumption leads to the 
subordination of God's creative and originative will to God's own being. It 
should also oppose the collateral assumption that objects of desire determine 
the will, not just influence it, and that when we don't pursue a particular 
desired object it is because another, even more desirable, object is attracting 
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us instead. Augustine speaks as if human beings will what they most desire 
or love because the object's desirability draws them to it. A consistent vol-
untarist should instead say that, in their willing, people can at least sometimes 
freely choose what kinds of things they desire or love, that they can choose 
their own basic dispositions, that at its root their willing has no determining 
cause but the willing itself. This libertarian thesis calls for qualification in 
the face of such factors as biological heredity, body chemistry, and environ-
mental influences, which seem to circumscribe human freedom severely, at 
least for some individuals. But the case of God has no counterpart to this; a 
truly free God has no heredity or body chemistry, and no environment God 
might choose to create could circumscribe his freedom so as to make him 
materially incapable of willing moral evil. No factor of these kinds prevents 
us from attributing to God a will like a self-moving hinge, one that can turn 
away from, Le., will incompatibly with, his own ontologically good being. 
A bolder and perhaps reckless declaration appears in Luther's Bondage of 
the Will, in his discussion of God's hardening of pharaoh's heart, and of 
God's allowing Adam to fall: 
God is he for whose will no cause or ground may be laid down as its rule 
and standard; for nothing is on a level with it or above it, but it is itself the 
rule for all things. If any rule or standard, cause or ground, existed for it, it 
could no longer be the will of God. What God wills is not right because he 
ought, or was bound, so to will; on the contrary, what takes place must be 
right, because he so wills it. Causes and grounds are laid down for the will 
of the creature, but not for the will of the creator-unless you set another 
creator over him!17 
Pike's position need not go this far in order to give credibility to God's moral 
freedom. The very norms of moral goodness need not be arbitrary for God 
to be free in a morally praiseworthy sense; God just needs to have the capa-
bility to violate them. 18 
How might we modify the classical view of divine will so as to exploit the 
Augustinian theme without slipping into the perilous Lutheran overstate-
ment? Let us look in more detail at two specific issues. One is the relation 
of God's will to time. According to classical theism, the timelessly eternal 
God wills certain events to occur in certain ways and at certain times in the 
world's history. God timelessly wills rain for today and clear skies for to-
morrow. Such a God could timelessly will a moral good (e.g., the sparing of 
an endangered child) or a moral evil (e.g., the needlessly cruel death of an 
innocent child). A timelessly eternal will does not "change its mind," even 
though to a time-bound observer of its acts it might appear to do so. But 
mustn't a timeless will have a fixed character or disposition, albeit freely 
chosen, from which its transient acts flow in morally (or immorally) uniform 
fashion? We do not at the empirical level attribute a fixed character (wholly 
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good or wholly evil) to people as moral agents, and we need not attribute one 
to a timeless God either.19 The only insight into God's character we have 
derives from what God has done, said or promised; and a free being who 
promises can break those promises. That a free and eternal God can will moral 
evil means that God can timelessly choose not to be consistent regarding the 
moral quality of his acts in time. So we do not necessarily have to reject the 
classical view of a timeless deity for the sake of God's moral freedom. And 
even if we do reject it in favor of a view of God's temporal eternity, or of 
an even more radical temporality, "God cannot bring himself to do moral 
evil" need only mean that we do not think God has willed moral evil in the 
past, and we do not expect or fear that he will do so in the future, although 
he could. 
A second issue is whether God can will evil for its own sake. Willing evil 
need not be the consequence of inappropriately willing a lesser good than 
one ought to will, because willing is not necessarily an appetitive act directed 
toward a desirable object. Disobedience of a moral law might be willed not 
for the sake of some other and lesser ontological good. A truly free agent can 
simply choose to disobey for no reason at all apart from the choosing itself; 
"perversity" is not a reason for deliberately willing evilly, but is just what 
we call doing so without a reason. (The overly intellectualistic tradition of 
classical theism, with its underdeveloped notion of will, cannot account for 
the event in which a person freely, deliberately, and irrationally wills moral 
evil just because he or she chooses to, and not because of being in the grip 
of bodily passions or the like.) This bold statement presupposes a basically 
Kantian, rather than Platonic-Aristotelian, view of human will (and, by ex-
tension, of divine will). A Kantian will freely and responsibly chooses the 
maxims in accord with which it then executes its particular choices, or further 
particular acts of will. Such a will is free to choose other maxims than the 
ones currently guiding it, Le., it is free to change its basic cast from good to 
evil or vice versa. I have of course no proD/that this view of will is the correct 
one for all free beings and contexts, although I believe that it is; nor have I 
proof that there truly is akrasia understood as irrational choice of some evil 
freely made after fuIl deliberation, although I believe that there is. What I do 
contend is that Pike's position needs a view of the divine will along these 
lines if it is to carry through fully with its critique of traditional theism. 
A necessarily good God of the Thomistic sort is a God with scarcely any 
"will" at all in a morally relevant sense of the term. A truly free God, 
however, could will a moral evil incompatible with the very moral law that 
the same God generally commands and himself obeys on other occasions. If 
he did that, it would seem silly to say (in Aristotelian language) that God 
appetitively disobeys his own law for the sake of some other and lesser good. 
Instead we should simply say that for this occasion God wills differently than 
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he usually does, and for that there is no cause other than God's free choice 
itself. A truly free God who can will irrationally is religiously preferable to 
a God who is not morally free and hence not truly moral at all. 
V. What Kind of God? What Kind of Good? 
The sort of God to be affirmed by a further development of Pike's position 
is one whose free will is at least coequal with his own ontologically good 
being. The requirement of a genuinely independent will seems to call for a 
bipolar deity. One model of such a deity appears in Schelling's essays, Of 
Human Freedom (1809) and The Ages of the World (1811-1815).20 Despite 
its idiosyncrasies, Schelling's view of a bipolar God is worth a brief look 
here because it stresses divine freedom in a way that remains in lively con-
versation with the concerns of classical theism. It may serve to push Pike's 
position further in the direction it needs to develop. 
The being of Schelling's God couldn't be other than it is, in the sense of 
having different attributes or ontological perfections. Yet it could "not be at 
all" if God didn't freely and timelessly will it. The fundamental elements, or 
what Schelling calls the "powers," of any being whatsoever admit of only 
one stable structure. Schelling's God freely wills that he have this order or 
structure himself, and by doing so he gives to himself a stable being. But 
God doesn't have to will it, for he could instead eternally choose to remain 
simply a will and a turmoil of disorderly powers. Schelling might rephrase 
Aquinas by saying that God freely wills his own being and ontological good-
ness, which is necessary with respect to its essence or what it is, but is 
contingent with respect to its existence or actuality. This God also freely wills 
a creation, in which each individual member must likewise have a measure 
of ontological order and goodness if it is to exist at all, with God's own 
structural perfections as its paradigms. Schelling's God is therefore not free 
to create any sort of creatures whatsoever, although he is free not to create 
at all. However, in his dealings with creatures once they are created, God is 
free to will howsoever he wishes, is even free to will moral evil contrary to 
their well-being. This God's free will is not subordinated to his own onto-
logical goodness by some principle dictating that, for the existing creation, 
he can only will other things (events affecting the creatures) in accord with 
the perfect desirability or stability of his own being. One potentially worri-
some feature of this type of position, however, is that it seems such a free 
God could have timelessly willed certain moral laws to be other than they 
actually are for our world. A radically free God might neither be bound to 
have just the moral laws he does will nor, having willed them, be restrained 
by a material incapacity to disobey them himself. Would that result leave us 
with a fideistic stance after all, one in which whatever God wills is good by 
definition, in which "morally good" means "whatever God wills"? 
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Is the moral law given somehow in God's realized being, i.e., is God's own 
ontological structure the basis of morality? Classical theism for the most part 
thinks it is, as Reichenbach has shown in his critique of Aquinas. Alterna-
tively, might the moral law be an independent standard, whether ontological 
or of some other sort, against which the goodness of God's moral character 
and specific acts of will can be measured? When Aquinas and other classical 
theists speak about creation, they typically adopt the former perspective and 
say that God's being simply is the standard to which his acts of will conform. 
Some modem thinkers (e.g., Kantians) would find the latter perspective pref-
erable. Indeed, it is hard to see how classical theism as well can avoid the 
latter perspective when speaking of God's goodness as moral, as a character 
trait. That is because it is not evidently the same thing to be a standard and 
to meet a standard; and a free agent who is good in a morally praiseworthy 
sense seems to be not a standard itself but one who measures up to a standard. 
It seems distinctly odd to call "morally good" a God who (in Spinozistic 
fashion) simply is what he is, without reference to something other than what 
he simply is and has to be, whether that something might be a standard freely 
decreed by him or one independent of him. 
In any event, classical theism would not allow the content of "morally 
good" to be arbitrary, or will-dependent, nor would it allow that that content 
could have been other than it is. But suppose the moral law itself might have 
been different, had a truly free God (timelessly) willed differently than he 
does. "Is the good good because God wills it, or does God will it because it 
is goOd?"21 To say that "God wills the good because it is good" suggests, on 
one reading, that its goodness constrains God to will as he does. With a 
Thomistic God who is constrained to will his own (ontological) goodness 
with absolute necessity, and to will all other things (ontological and moral) 
in conformity with it, the immutability and necessity of God's own being as 
the sole standard of goodness is guaranteed, but at the price of depicting that 
God as morally unfree, as unable in the moral sphere (except for supererog-
atory acts) to be, to will, or to act, in a different manner than he does. To say 
instead that "the good is good because God wills it" would mean that the 
good's status as standard derives not from its own intrinsic nature, but instead 
from God's will and absolute power, which decree and establish it as the 
good. On this latter alternative we could place more stress on moral goodness 
and give full value to the conviction that God genuinely is or has free will, 
is truly morally praiseworthy. But we also risk making the content of the 
good arbitrary and changeable, for mightn't God have willed a different 
content instead? Are we stuck with a simple choice between these two op-
tions, or can we develop the implications of Pike's position in some third 
way? 
If we develop those implications with no more disturbance to classical 
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theism and to moral reflection than is absolutely necessary, then we might 
say three things about the standard of moral goodness in relation to God. 
1. The moral standard can be viewed as fixed rather than changeable, on a 
weaker and non-Thomistic reading of the first alternative above-i.e., that 
the good itself is the standard by which the goodness of God's particular 
moral acts is to be measured. 
It would not follow automatically from this principle that the fixity derives 
somehow from the nature of ontological goodness per se (i.e., the factors 
productive of ontological stability, whether in God or in creatures). Perhaps 
it is a standard that, in Kantian fashion, is properly moral rather than onto-
logical at its root. It also would not follow automatically that the standard 
would be wholly independent of God in all respects. Perhaps God timelessly 
decrees it, so that it both is unchangeable in actuality and could have been 
different (had God timelessly willed a different standard instead). Both of 
these issues are matters for further investigation. 
2. We can conceive of God, in his willing ad extra, as free to adhere to that 
standard or to violate it for any given occasion since, as standard (even 
as standard timelessly wiJIed), it wouldn't causally determine God's par-
ticular acts of wiJI to conform to it. 
3. God's freedom to violate the standard would be a prerequisite for God's 
goodness of will or of action being a moral goodness, being morally 
praiseworthy. 
From these principles and from the argument of this paper, it would follow 
that a morally free God can do or command moral evil not just on or for a 
single occasion (e.g., command the sacrifice of Isaac), but also over an ex-
tended period. Examples of the latter sort (on the assumption that these 
actions truly are commanded by God and do not just follow from human 
misconceptions of God's will) might be the systematic destruction of Can-
aanite cities by the Hebrews, the medieval Christian crusades, and the Islamic 
military jihad. According to this view, religious believers ought to concede 
that a morally free deity could command such things (although of course they 
need not affirm that he has in fact done so nor expect that he will), and that 
his doing so would not make them morally right. 
What then would it really mean to the religious believer to say that "God" 
is a title that could be forfeited? Suppose the supreme creator of the universe 
were to will moral evil for one or a few occasions. Suppose he truly did 
command Saul to "utterly destroy" the Amalekites, "man and woman, infant 
and suckling, ox and sheep, calliel and ass" (I Samuel 15:3)? Would the 
believer cease on that basis to worship and obey that creator, and instead 
deny that he is "God"? Would that be a realistic course? Surely we must strive 
to keep our moral integrity by refusing allegiance to a devil who is utterly 
evil (especially when there is a good God available to turn to instead). But 
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would it make sense to refuse allegiance to a predominantly good creator 
who is the only God, but who is able to (and perhaps does) freely slip into 
moral evil once in a great while? Where else in such a universe would we 
turn for help, for grace, for salvation?22 To ourselves? 
In sum, can Pike's first meaning of "God cannot sin" be modified in such 
a way that "God" remains a title but the logical incompatibility is removed, 
that the necessary connection between "God" and "good" is broken? That 
would require replacing "God cannot sin" in the first meaning with: "Morally, 
God is vastly superior to any other being." Then we could say: "If X is not 
vastly superior morally (as well as in other ways) to any other being, then X 
cannot qualify as God." A friend can act in an unfriendly manner once or 
twice without permanently forfeiting the title "friend." Religious believers 
might allow that God could will some moral evil without thereby ceasing to 
be "God." They might do well to acknowledge that God is morally free and 
really could sin although they don't expect him to, and that if God did sin 
(as an aberration) they would still worship him and call him "God." Is that 
too high a theological and philosophical price to pay for accepting the larger 
implications of Pike's argument about God's moral goodness? Perhaps not. 
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